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Abstract
This paper analyzes how to choose a delegation, a committee to represent a society such as
in a peace conference. We propose normative conditions and seek optimal, consistent, neutral
and non-manipulable ways to choose a delegation. We show that a novel class of threshold
rules are characterized by these criteria. The rules impose that a delegation is chosen when
its combined support in the society first reaches a particular percentage of the public opinion
- depending on the size of the delegation. Conversely, minority opinions that are not reflected
in the delegation should always be below a threshold, which follows a geometric series.
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1 Introduction
In many situations, individuals participate in collective decision making via a committee of rep-
resentatives or delegates, i.e., a multi-layered aggregation of individual opinions. Consider, for
instance, voting for candidates in elections to represent your opinion in representative democ-
racies. Those candidates, in turn, make decisions with your opinion in mind. Correspondingly,
peace conferences and negotiations over conflict zones require delegates to be sent by different
interest groups or ethnicities involved in a civil war. The choice of which interest group, ethnic-
ity, etc. to invite to the conference, however, may not be very straightforward. Especially not in
extremely heterogenous, polarized and/or divided societies.
With a peace conference scenario in mind, consider a society and issues it is facing. Thinking
of individual opinions (priority orderings) over these issues, we want to find out what limited set of
opinions we could choose to represent this society in a reasonable, fair way. Eventually, we might
bring together some people representing those opinions on behalf of the possibly very diverse
interest groups and hope to achieve consensus in the society. We are not interested per se in how
much relative importance an opinion has, but only in whether an opinion is relevant enough1 to be
invited to the table. The mechanism through which this table is formed should preferably respect
some minimal normative requirements. For instance, it should respect unanimous agreements in
the society and be consistent in choosing delegations for when similar societies are merged. We
expect it to be neutral in the way it treats the opinions, and also expect it to be non-manipulable.
We propose all these norms as criteria to choose who should get a seat at the table and then show
that there is a unique class of rules which satisfy all these criteria, hence a characterization result.
These novel rules are not trivial, and relatively simple to comprehend, making them practically
usable to set the table for peace negotiations.
Our framework assumes individuals to have preferences/rankings over some available issues,
also known as a preference profile of a society. We formalize the delegation rules as systems
that assign preferences2 to each given preference profile. We then propose conditions on how
to choose delegates for this society. We first require that if all individuals in a society agree on
how to rank one issue over another, the delegation should respect that. This is also known as
Pareto optimality. Second, we impose that when two distinct societies represented by identical
delegations merge, the merged society should also be represented by the same delegation (Young,
1974, 1975; Smith, 1973), an idea known as Consistency3. Our third condition, Ballot neutrality
1Of course in principle, plurality requires that every opinion should be included in the peace talks. This is
perhaps preferable when there is a limited number of available opinions. However, in cases where the number of
ethnicities/interest groups are numerous, it becomes implausible to invite all as delegates to the table. For more
on inclusivity of peace negotiations see Dudouet and Lundstro¨m (2016); Planta et al. (2015); Papagianni (2014)
and Lanz (2011).
2Since the delegation does not necessarily comprise of a single ranking, a delegation rule herein corresponds to
a social welfare correspondence instead of a social welfare function. However, we employ the term delegation as it
entails a particular interpretation.
3Consistency additionally implies that the delegation choice is anonymous, a condition which requires that the
names of the individuals do not matter.
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reflects an idea of fairness, and requires that only the ballots of individual opinions should matter
in the delegation choice4. Finally, we require that no individual can manipulate the choice of
delegates to their advantage. This condition is called Strategy-proofness. The first two, Pareto
optimality and consistency, are very standard conditions in the literature. In what follows we
explain further ballot neutrality and strategy-proofness.
Ballot neutrality, imposes neutrality towards “equivalent ballots”. Consider two societies of
equal size, say 6 individuals, facing three issues, hence six possible preferences. Now represent
the opinions in both societies by the number of followers each preference has, e.g., (3, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0)
and (0, 1, 2,3, 0, 0). As it happens, the two societies have “equivalent” ballots, i.e., the support
distribution is merely a shuﬄing of the number of followers. In this case, we require the delegation
choice in each society to correspond to the support for the delegates. For instance, if the first
preference in the former ballot with a support of 3, is chosen as a delegate in the former society
then the fourth preferences in the latter ballot should also be chosen in the second society. Ballot
neutrality is also a variable alternative axiom which necessitates that increasing the number of
available issues, and preferences, does not influence the outcome so long as the distributions of
supported opinions are equivalent5. We explain this further in detail in the coming section and
provide an example in the appendix.
Strategy-proofness requires that the rule is not manipulable by individuals (or coalitions).
Therefore a rule being strategy-proof naturally induces honest reporting of individual opinions.
Consider a society and a delegation representing it. Suppose an individual misreports his opinion
and this alters the delegation such that at least one new delegate is strictly closer6 to his opinion
than any other delegate in the original delegation. This situation is considered as a successful
manipulation. We require that the delegation choice should not be prone to any such manipu-
lation. If a rule is not manipulable by any individual then we call this condition as individual
strategy-proofness, whereas if no coalition of individuals can achieve such manipulation, we call
this as coalitional strategy-proofness. The latter is a stronger requirement than the former.7
We find that there exists a non-dictatorial, non-trivial and in fact, simple class of rules which
is characterized by these conditions, and which we call as threshold rules. All these rules share
4Ballot neutrality additionally implies that the delegation choice is neutral, a condition which requires that the
names of the issues do not matter.
5For instance, increasing the number of issues to 4, and hence the number of possible preferences to 24, would
still yield R1 as a delegate if the ballot stayed as (3, 2, 1, 0, 0, . . . , 0).
6We use the most typical measure of closeness for rankings, i.e., the Kemeny distance (Kemeny, 1959).
7When preferences are aggregated into a single alternative, i.e., social choice functions, Gibbard (1973) and
Satterthwaite (1975), shows the impossibility of finding such proper non-dictatorial and strategy-proof rules. See
Barbera` (2011) for more on strategy-proof social choice functions. For strategy proofness of multi-valued social
choice rules, see Barbera` et al. (2001). When preferences are aggregated into a single ranking, i.e., social welfare
functions, the results are mixed since the definition of strategy-proofness can be quite numerous. Bossert and
Storcken (1992) proves an impossibility result, Sato (2013) offers more positive news, and finally Bossert and
Sprumont (2014) uses a weaker version of strategy-proofness than in Bossert and Storcken (1992) and provides
some examples of non-manipulable rules. Our strategy-proofness concept is essentially different than that of Bossert
and Storcken (1992) and Athanasoglou (2016) since we allow multiple preferences in the outcome.
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a common lower bound in terms of how much representative power they require for all possible
sizes of delegations. For instance, if a delegation is composed of t delegates, then the ratio of the
individuals supporting those delegates to the whole society must be strictly higher than 1− 0.5t.
The delegation rules we characterize only differ in “how high” the thresholds are set above the
common lower bound. For each threshold rule, there exists a threshold function f which imposes
how much minimal support a delegation of size t has to have to be an appropriate representation
for a society. The rule orders each possible ranking/delegate according to their support in the
society and chooses the lowest number of delegates t∗ with a total support reaching the respective
threshold, i.e., f(t∗). For example, a threshold rule might require 60% of the society’s support
for singleton delegations, i.e., f(1). If this support is not found, then it might look for 85% of the
society’s support for a delegation of size 2, f(2). If this support is not found, then the process
continues, with monotonically increasing thresholds for each t. We show that all threshold rules
satisfy two conditions: i) f(1) > 0.5 and ii) 1 ≥ f(t) ≥ (f(t − 1) + 1)/2 for t > 2, i.e.,minimal
threshold for a singleton delegation is above 50%, and the minimal threshold for delegations of
size t is at least the average of the previous level, f(t − 1) and 100%, but at most 100%. Of
course, f(1) can also start from 100% (and hence continue at that level), requiring 100% support
for each possible sizes of delegations, which can only be reached by including all the reported
preferences. Threshold rules are well-defined, as the threshold for t sooner or later reaches 100%.
As Lanz (2011) argues, “Only stakeholders who add value to the process and augment the
chances of reaching a sustainable settlement should be given seats at the table, [...]”. The chal-
lenge, therefore, is to make the invitations to the table from a normative perspective while
maintaining inclusivity and feasibility. This paper proposes a quantitative measure on how to set
the table for invitations, the number of seats at the table, and finally how representative in total,
the invitees must minimally be.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the notation and conditions. In Section 3, we
define threshold rules and provide some examples. In Section 4, we provide our characterization.
Section 5 concludes with some policy implication.
2 Basic Notation
2.1 Model
Let A be a countably infinite set of alternatives, interpreted as potential issues. Given a finite
nonempty subset A ( A, preferences are taken to be strict priority rankings of these issues,
formalized as complete, antisymmetric and transitive binary relations over the set of alternatives
A. We denote the set of all preferences over A by L(A). Given a preference R ∈ L(A), and two
disjoint alternatives a and b, the case where a is preferred to b can be denoted by R = .a.b. or
(a, b) ∈ R. To measure closeness we use the well-known Kemeny distance.8 Formally, for two
preferences R1 and R2, the Kemeny distance is δ(R1, R2) = (|R2 \R1|+ |R1 \R2|)/2, half of the
8Kemeny (1959) introduced this distance. For a recent, improved characterization, see Can and Storcken (2013).
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symmetric set difference.
Let N be a countably infinite set of agents, interpreted as potential individuals. Given a
finite nonempty subset N ( N with cardinality n, L(A)n denotes the set of all preference profiles
P , i.e., preferences of n agents where P (i) refers to the preference of agent i ∈ N and P (S)
refers to the preference profile, say a subprofile, of a subset of agents S ⊆ N . Given a profile
P ∈ L(A)n, and R ∈ L(A), we denote the number of agents who reported R in this profile as
p(R) = |{i ∈ N | P (i) = R}|.
Given any finite A ( A, let R1, R2, . . . , R|A|! be an enumeration of preferences in L(A), e.g.,
the lexicographic enumeration for A = {a, b, c} is “R1 = abc,R2 = acb,R3 = bac,R4 = bca,R5 =
cab,R6 = cba”. Given any such enumeration, a profile P ∈ L(A)n can also be interpreted as a
vector composed of the number of followers each preference has, e.g., p = (p1, p2, , p3, . . . , p|A|!)
on N|A|! with the interpretation that pt = |{i ∈ N | P (i) = Rt}| is the support for preference
Rt ∈ L(A) and p is the support for the preference profile P . As an example, for 3 alternatives
and the enumeration given above, the support for the following preference profile,
P ∈ L(A)6 = {abc, abc, abc︸ ︷︷ ︸
R1
, bac, bac︸ ︷︷ ︸
R3
, cab︸︷︷︸
R5
}
can be denoted by p = (3, 0, 2, 0, 1, 0). For simplicity, we also denote the “normalized support”
for the same profile similarly, e.g., p = (0.5, 0, 0.3¯, 0, 0.16¯, 0).
Consider two disjoint finite sets of agents N,N ′, and preference profiles P ∈ L(A)n, and
P ′ ∈ L(A)n′ . Then, P¯ = (P, P ′) ∈ L(A)n+n′ denotes the merging of two profiles, i.e, P¯ (i) = P (i)
if i ∈ N and P¯ (i) = P ′(i) if i ∈ N ′. If P and P ′ are such that there exists a bijection σ : N ↔ N ′
such that P (i) = P ′(σ(i)) for all i ∈ N , then we call P¯ = (P, P ′) as a two-fold replica of P and
denote it by 2P . The definition naturally extends to all c-fold replicas cP of P , for any c ≥ 2 for
c ∈ N.
Given any finite N ( N and any A ( A, a delegation rule ϕ is a social welfare correspondence
which assigns every preference profile P ∈ L(A)n a nonempty subset of preferences ϕ(P ) ⊆ L(A),
interpreted as the set of delegates or the delegation for this society.
2.2 Conditions
Next, we introduce some conditions on how to choose a delegation. Unless otherwise mentioned,
we assume the conditions to hold for all set of alternatives, A ( A, and for all set of agents,
N ( N . The first condition requires that if everyone prefers an alternative over another, then no
delegate should say otherwise.
Definition 1. Pareto optimality: A rule ϕ is Pareto Optimal whenever for all P ∈ L(A)n and
for all a, b ∈ A, if for all i ∈ N , (a, b) ∈ P (i), then for all R ∈ ϕ(P ), (a, b) ∈ R.
The second condition we impose concerns merging of two societies each endowed with the
same delegation. In such situations, the delegation assigned to the merged society should remain
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the same. This concept is well known in many contexts under varying names with slight changes,
including reinforcement, homogeneity9, etc.
Definition 2. Consistency: A rule ϕ is consistent whenever for any two disjoint finite sets
N,N ′ ( N (with cardinality n and n′ respectively) and for profiles, P ∈ L(A)n and P ′ ∈ L(A)n′ ,
if ϕ(P ) = ϕ(P ′) then ϕ((P, P ′)) = ϕ(P ) = ϕ(P ′).
The third condition we impose concerns variable alternative scenarios, wherein the fixed set
of individuals face more issues to report their preferences on. Consider, for instance, two sets of
alternatives A ( A¯ such that |A| = 3 and |A¯| = 4. Consider two profiles on these sets with the
following frequency supports:
P ∈ L(A)n with p = (3, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0) and P¯ ∈ L(A¯)n with p¯ = (0, 1, 2, 3, 0, . . . , 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
20 entries
Note that the nonzero entries in each vector are identical (except for the shuﬄing). Our
condition requires that shuﬄing the support for preferences should shuﬄe the delegates in the
exact same way.10 Formally, given A ⊆ A¯ ( A, a profile P ∈ L(A)n and an injection11 pi :
{1, 2, . . . , |A|!} → {1, 2, . . . , |A¯|!}, we say P¯ ∈ L(A¯)n is an “expansion of P by pi” if for all
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |A|!} we have pi = p¯pi(i). We consider such profiles P, P¯ to have equivalent ballots
and call pi as a corresponding injection.12
Definition 3. Ballot neutrality: A rule is ballot neutral whenever for any P ∈ L(A)n, P¯ ∈
L(A¯)n with equivalent ballots, and for any corresponding injection pi, we have:
Ri ∈ ϕ(P ) if and only if R¯pi(i) ∈ ϕ(P¯ ).
We provide an example in Appendix A.2 to demonstrate this condition.13 Next, we show that
ballot neutrality, together with Pareto optimality, implies that the delegation can only be chosen
from preferences that are reported. Thus we do not have to worry about finding a delegate whose
role would be to represent some “compromised” preference. Let RP (P ) = {R ∈ L(A) | p(R) > 0},
denote the set of reported preferences, preferences which are reported by at least one agent in
profile P .
Proposition 2.1. If a rule ϕ satisfies Pareto optimality and ballot neutrality, then for all P ∈
L(A)n, ϕ(P ) ⊆ RP (P ).
9Homogeneity is a milder version of this concept, which requires that result would be insensitive to replicating
the population (Fishburn, 1977).
10This condition is, in fact, an amalgamation of two well-known axioms, neutrality and anonymity, and stronger
than both.
11For A = A¯, pi is a permutation.
12There may be more than one corresponding injection for two equivalent ballots.
13Note that the definition of ballot neutrality even extends to profiles on two disjoint sets of alternatives. For
instance, let A = {x, y, z} and B = {a, b, c}, and consider two profiles P ∈ L(A)n and P¯ ∈ L(B)n with identical
ballots. Consider expansions of P and P¯ , say P ′ and P¯ ′ respectively, to A∪B by some injection. Ballot neutrality
applies between P and P ′ (and between P¯ and P¯ ′). By construction, P ′ and P¯ ′ have equivalent ballots. Therefore
ballot neutrality applies between P ′ and P¯ ′. This, in turn, imposes ballot neutrality between P and P¯ .
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Proof. The proof is in Appendix B.1.
The following remark says that we can always find an expansion for a profile in which delegates
and non-delegates are clustered, that is, each agent whose preference is not in the delegation will
prefer any non-delegate to any delegate. In other words, every agent who supports a preference
which is not part of the delegation would like to enlarge the delegation set.
Let us extend our definition of injections to sets of preferences. Given A ⊆ A¯ ( A and any
injection pi : {1, 2, . . . |A|!} → {1, 2, . . . |A¯|!}, and any X ⊆ L(A),
pi(X) = {R¯pi(i) ∈ L(A¯) | Ri ∈ X}.
Remark 2.1. Note that, since A is infinite, for any A ( A, for any preference profile on A and
for any two disjoint sets X,Y ( L(A), we can always find an expansion P by some pi of the initial
preference profile such that the injections of the two sets X and Y (denoted respectively by pi(X)
and pi(Y )), form clusters that are “far away” from each other. Formally:
max
R,R′∈pi(X)
δ(R,R′) < min
R∈pi(X),R′∈pi(Y )
δ(R,R′)
(The example in Appendix A.3 illustrates how this remark is implemented.)
Our third condition, strategy-proofness, implies that no agent should “benefit” from mis-
reporting his preference, i.e., truth telling is a weakly dominant strategy. We say an agent i
weakly prefers a delegate R1 to another delegate R2, whenever P (i) is weakly closer to R1 than
it is to R2 in terms of the Kemeny distance, i.e., δ(P (i), R1) ≤ δ(P (i), R2). Similarly, we say
an agent i weakly prefers a delegation D1 to another delegation D2, whenever P (i) is weakly
closer to the most preferred delegate in D1 than it is to the most preferred delegate in D2, i.e.,
min{δ(P (i), R1) | R1 ∈ D1} ≤ min{δ(P (i), R2) | R2 ∈ D2}. Strategy proofness means that
every agent weakly prefers the delegation they get under true preferences to any delegation they
achieve by misreporting. In other words, there is no possibility of misreporting and getting a
new delegate in the delegation which is closer to the agent’s preference. Here, we take the closest
delegate as the only relevant one for the agents, meaning agents do not care about the distance
to other delegates.14 We first discuss the usual individual strategy-proofness and afterward the
coalitional version of it. In the sequel we shall only use the former, however, we show later in
Proposition 2.2 that the latter is implied by the former under ballot neutrality.
Definition 4. Strategy-proofness: A rule ϕ is strategy-proof whenever for all i ∈ N and for
all P ∈ L(A)n, there exists no P ′ = (P ′(i), P (N \ {i})) ∈ L(A)n such that
min
R∈ϕ(P )
δ(P (i), R) > min
R∈ϕ(P ′)
δ(P (i), R).
14Here we do not assume any negative externality in representativeness, i.e., agents only care about the delegate(s)
that are closest to them in terms of representation. Note, however, that other methods, e.g., averaging the distances
to set D, or taking the median preference in D would give perfectly valid but different scenarios of representation.
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Definition 5. Coalitional strategy-proofness: A rule is coalitional strategy-proof whenever
for all coalitions S ⊆ N and for all P ∈ L(A)n, there exists no P ′ = (P ′(S), P (N \ S)) ∈ L(A)n
such that:
min
R∈ϕ(P )
δ(P (i), R) > min
R∈ϕ(P ′)
δ(P (i), R)
for all i ∈ S.
Remark 2.2. Note that our individual strategy-proofness concept is essentially different than
that of Bossert and Storcken (1992) and of Athanasoglou (2016). We allow multiple preferences
in the outcome (in the case of single-valued delegation rules they are equivalent). A recent
paper by Bossert and Sprumont (2014) differs from the former two interpretations since the
manipulation is based on a concept known as betweenness (see also Grandmont (1978), Kemeny
(1959), and Sato (2013)). In their interpretation, an agent can benefit only when the outcome
is manipulated to somewhere between herself and the preference corresponding to truth telling.
In our interpretation agents can benefit when the outcome is manipulated to anywhere, resulting
a closer preference. This makes the strategy-proofness we propose, ceteris paribus, stronger and
harder to satisfy. We provide an example in Appendix A.1 which is strategy-proof in the sense
of Bossert and Sprumont (2014), but not in the way we interpret it.
Next, we show that under ballot neutrality strategy-proofness implies coalitional strategy-
proofness. We use this implication throughout the proofs.
Proposition 2.2. If a rule ϕ is strategy-proof and ballot neutral, then it is also coalitional
strategy-proof.
Proof. Let ϕ be a strategy-proof and ballot neutral rule. For any A ( A, any N ( N and any
P ∈ An, and for any S ⊆ {i ∈ N | P (i) 6∈ ϕ(P )}, let us denote any deviation from P by agents
in S as P ′ = (P ′(S), P (N \S)). Let W = ϕ(P ) and O = L(A) \ϕ(P ) denote a partition of L(A).
By Remark 2.1, there exists an expansion of P by pi, say P¯ , where W¯ = pi(W ) and O¯ = pi(O)
such that
max
R¯,R′∈O¯
δ(R¯, R′) < min
R¯∈O¯,R′∈W¯
δ(R¯, R′). (2.1)
Consider any enumeration of i ∈ S, i.e. S = {1, 2, ..., s}. Let us construct expanded profiles,
P¯0, P¯1, . . . , P¯s, with P¯0 = P¯ , P¯s = P¯
′ (the expansion of P ′ by pi, i.e., P¯ ′ = (P¯ ′(S), P¯ (N \S)), and
for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , s}, P¯i = (P¯ ′({1, 2, . . . , i}), P¯ (N \ {1, 2, . . . , i})). This is a formalization of
the idea that any deviation by a coalition can be constructed as a result of consecutive unilateral
deviations by a sequence of agents.
By Proposition 2.1, ϕ(P¯i) ⊆ RP (P¯i) for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , s}. Note that from P¯0 to P¯1,
there cannot be a preference R¯ ∈ O¯ that becomes a new delegate for P¯1. This is because by
Inequality 2.1, we have that for all R′ ∈ W¯ , δ(R¯, P¯ (1)) < δ(R′, P¯ (1)) and this would contradict
individual strategy proofness. A similar argument holds from P¯i to P¯i+1 for any i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , s−
1}. As the choice of enumeration of agents in S is arbitrary, eventually this implies that there
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exists no R¯ ∈ O¯ such that R¯ ∈ ϕ(P¯s). As P¯s = P¯ ′, and P¯ ′ is an expansion of P ′, then there
exists no R ∈ O, such that R ∈ ϕ(P ′), since there exists no R¯ ∈ O with R¯ ∈ ϕ(P¯ ′). Then
ϕ(P ′) ⊆ W = ϕ(P ). As ϕ(P ′) is a subset of ϕ(P ), this implies that no agent in S has become
strictly better off, i.e.,
There exists no i ∈ S such that min
R∈ϕ(P )
δ(P (i), R) > min
R∈ϕ(P ′)
δ(P (i), R).
Since all agents whose preferences are already included in the delegation, i.e, P (i) ∈ W has
distance of zero to the delegation, they will not have any incentive to deviate or to join a coalition.
This means that there cannot be any coalition S which can successfully manipulate.
3 Using thresholds for delegation rules
In this section, we introduce a large class of delegation rules which we call as threshold rules.
Every threshold rule is associated with a particular threshold function which we introduce below.
Thereafter we show that the rules are well-defined and provide some examples within this special
class of delegation rules.
Definition 6. Threshold Function: A threshold function is a function denoted by f : Z+ →
(12 , 1] ∩Q such that for all t:
f(t) ≥ f(t− 1) + 1
2
.
These functions simply assign a threshold for each possible delegation of size t. Let us in-
troduce some additional notation to define the threshold rules. Given any P ∈ L(A)n, consider
an enumeration which orders preferences according to their support from the agents from the
strongest to weakest, i.e., pi ≥ pi+1. For example, p = (0.5, 0.3¯, 0.16¯, 0, 0, . . . , 0) denotes the
normalized support for P . Let us also denote the corresponding preferences as R1, R2, . . . , R|A|
i.e., R1 is the preference with the strongest support and so forth.
15 Then we can define the
cumulative support ρ as the cumulative vector of p, i.e., for all i, ρi = p1 + . . .+ pi. For instance,
the cumulative support for the aforementioned P is: ρ = (0.5, 0.83¯, 1, 1, . . . , 1).
We first introduce the threshold rules as an algorithm, then proceed with the formal definition.
Take any profile P and the cumulative support for it as ρ. Consider any threshold function
f . Let R1, R2, . . . R|A| denote an ordering of preferences according to their support, with ties
broken arbitrarily.
Step 1: Check whether ρ1 ≥ f(1). If yes, ϕf (P ) = {R1} and the algorithm stops.
Otherwise, go to the next step.
15Note that some preferences in profiles might have equal support with a tie. In that case, the enumeration of
those preferences can be chosen arbitrarily.
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Step 2: Check whether ρ2 ≥ f(2). If yes, ϕf (P ) = {R1, R2} and the algorithm stops.
Otherwise, go to the next step.
...
Step t: Check whether ρt ≥ f(t). If yes, ϕf (P ) = {R1, R2, R3, . . . , Rt} and the algorithm
stops. Otherwise, go to the next step.
...
Note that the algorithm stops after finite steps since we are dealing with a finite subset A of
A. Next, we propose the formal definition. Again, given any profile P , we use the enumeration
R1, R2, . . . R|A| which orders according to the size of the support.
Definition 7. Threshold Rule: Given a threshold function f and P ∈ L(A)n, a threshold rule
is ϕf (P ) = {R1, R2, . . . , Rt∗} where t∗ = arg min
t
{t ∈ Z+ | ρt ≥ f(t)}.
Thus the threshold rule select the lowest number of delegates at which the relevant threshold
for total support is reached. However, there are two immediate concerns about these delegations
rules. The first is whether we can always find a delegation that exceeds the threshold. The second
is what happens when the algorithm stops at t∗, where two preferences have equal support, i.e.,
pt∗ = pt∗+1 and Rt∗ ∈ ϕf (P ) but Rt∗+1 6∈ ϕf (P ). We address both concerns in Proposition 3.1
which shows that the rules are well-defined.
Proposition 3.1. For all A ( A, N ( N , P ∈ L(A)n, and all threshold functions f , the
threshold rule ϕf (P ) is well-defined.
Proof. The proof is in Appendix 3.1.
Example 3.1. We will show four different delegation rules that are their threshold rules in the
case of three alternatives. Let us consider the three different preference profiles, P 1, P 2, and P 3
denoted below by the normalized support (on the left side) and the cumulative support (on the
right side) for preferences. Note that for the sake of simplicity we use profiles with the same
enumeration wherein the support for Ri is decreasing in i.
p1 = (0.31, 0.29, 0.29, 0.11, 0, 0) ρ1 = (0.31, 0.6, 0.89, 1, 1, 1)
p2 = (0.78, 0.12, 0.1, 0, 0, 0) ρ2 = (0.78, 0.9, 1, 1, 1, 1)
p3 = (0.55, 0.12, 0.11, 0.11, 0.11, 0) ρ3 = (0.55, 0.67, 0.78, 0.89, 1, 1)
The visualizations which is provided below capture the essence of threshold rules. Even
though neither cumulative supports nor the relevant thresholds for each cardinality are actually
continuous values, connecting discrete values via lines makes visualization easier. In the follow-
ing graphs, the first number of delegates that a cumulative support is above the corresponding
threshold indicates the number of delegates in the delegation.
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Throughout these examples, let us denote the threshold function as f = (., . . . , 1, . . .), where
the ith entry corresponds to f(i). Since this function is increasing and has the bound of 1, once
the value of 1 is reached, all further values is equal to 1.
• The first rule, ϕ1 is defined by the threshold function f1 = (0.51, 0.76, 0.89, 0.95, 1, . . .). This
rule checks whether the total support for some delegation reaches the relevant threshold for
the size of the delegation, and if it does, picks that delegation with the smallest number of
delegates.
• The second rule we deal with, ϕ2 is characterized by the threshold vector, f2 = (0.51, 1, . . .).
This rule checks whether there exists any preference that is supported by more at least 51%
of the agents and if it is the case makes it the singleton delegate. If it is not the case, the
rule picks all reported preferences instead.
• The third rule we deal with, ϕ3 is characterized by the threshold vector, f3 = (0.6¯, 1, . . .).
This rule checks whether there exists any preference that is supported by more at least
two-thirds of the agents (a.k.a. qualified majority), and if it is the case, then makes it the
singleton delegate. If it is not the case, the rule picks all reported preferences instead.
• The last rule we deal with, ϕ4 is the reported preference rule RP (P ), which chooses all
preferences reported. The relevant threshold vector is f4 = (1, . . .), i.e. the total support
for any delegation should be at least 100%.
Visualizations of the rules and the delegations for each example profile is provided below. The
bold numbers for ρi, indicates that Ri is a chosen delegate for the profile p under the rule ϕ
f .
1 2 3 4 5 6
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Number of delegates
T
h
re
sh
ol
d
t. rule ϕ1
ρ1
ρ2
ρ3
f1 = (0.51, 0.76, 0.89, 0.95, 1, . . .)
ρ1 = (0.31,0.6,0.89, 1, 1, 1)
ρ2 = (0.78, 0.9, 1, 1, 1, 1)
ρ3 = (0.55, 0.67, 0.78, 0.89, 1, 1)
As it can be seen from the graph, ϕ1(P 1) = {R1, R2, R3}, while ϕ1(P 2) = ϕ1(P 3) = {R1}.
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f2 = (0.51, 1, . . .)
ρ1 = (0.31,0.6,0.89,1, 1, 1)
ρ2 = (0.78, 0.9, 1, 1, 1, 1)
ρ3 = (0.55, 0.67, 0.78, 0.89, 1, 1)
As it can be seen from the graph, ϕ2(P 1) = {R1, R2, R3, R4}, while ϕ2(P 2) = ϕ2(P 3) = {R1}.
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f3 = (0.6¯, 1, . . .)
ρ1 = (0.31,0.6,0.89,1, 1, 1)
ρ2 = (0.78, 0.9, 1, 1, 1, 1)
ρ3 = (0.55,0.67,0.78,0.89,1, 1)
As it can be seen from the graph, ϕ3(P 1) = {R1, R2, R3, R4}, ϕ3(P 2) = {R1}, and ϕ3(P 3) =
{R1, R2, R3, R4, R5}.
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f4 = (1, . . .)
ρ1 = (0.31,0.6,0.89,1, 1, 1)
ρ2 = (0.78,0.9,1, 1, 1, 1)
ρ3 = (0.55,0.67,0.78,0.89,1, 1)
As it can be seen from the graph, ϕ4(P 1) = {R1, R2, R3, R4}, ϕ4(P 2) = {R1, R2, R3}, and
ϕ4(P 3) = {R1, R2, R3, R4, R5}.
4 Characterization of the threshold delegation rules
In this section, we show that the conditions of Pareto optimality, consistency, ballot neutrality,
and strategy-proofness characterize the class of delegation rules which we explained in the previous
section. We show that these conditions lead to some implications concerning the behaviour of the
delegation rules. The first four lemmas shape the structure of the rules concerning the support of
delegates. Another four lemmas prove the existence of a series of critical thresholds for choosing
delegates and set forth the structure of these thresholds. We conclude the section with our main
theorem which states that the only rules satisfying the conditions we demand are the threshold
delegation rules.
4.1 Delegates and their support in the society
In what follows, Lemma 4.1 shows that if a preference is chosen as a delegate, then any other
preference with stronger support in the society should also be chosen. Lemma 4.2 argues that
rules should only care about the percentage of the support, i.e., only the normalized support of
preference profiles matter. Lemma 4.3 proves that i) equal redistribution of the total support for
the delegates among themselves does not change the delegation, and ii) equal redistribution of
the total support for the rest among themselves also does not modify the delegation.
Lemma 4.1. If a rule ϕ satisfies consistency, ballot neutrality, and strategy-proofness, then for
all A ( A, N ( N and P ∈ L(A)n if R ∈ ϕ(P ) and p(R′) ≥ p(R), we have R′ ∈ ϕ(P ).
Proof. The proof is in Appendix B.3.
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This lemma and Proposition 2.1 implies that any rule satisfying these conditions will have a
delegation composed of preferences with relatively higher support compared to preferences that
are not in the delegation. The following lemma proves the delegations to be the same for two
different societies with identical normalized supports. Let p/n = (p1n ,
p2
n , . . . ,
p|A|!
n ) denote the
normalized support.
Lemma 4.2. If a rule ϕ satisfies consistency and ballot neutrality, then for all A ( A, N,N ′ ( N
and for all P ∈ L(A)n, P ′ ∈ L(A)n′ such that p/n = p′/n′, we have ϕ(P ) = ϕ(P ′).
Proof. The proof is in Appendix B.4.
The following lemma proves that neither averaging between supports of chosen delegates nor
averaging between supports of non-delegates will change the delegation.
Lemma 4.3. If a rule ϕ satisfies consistency and ballot neutrality, then for all A ( A, N ( N
and P ∈ L(A)n, denoting |ϕ(P )| = t, and picking an enumeration on L(A) such that pi ≥ pj for
all i < j, the following holds:
i) For any N ′ ( N for any P ′ ∈ L(A)n′ such that p
′
j
n′ =
t∑
i=1
pi
nt for all j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t} and
p′j
n′ =
pj
n for all j ∈ {t+ 1, t+ 2, . . . , |A|!} we have ϕ(P ) = ϕ(P ′).
ii) For any N ′′ ( N and for any P ′′ ∈ L(A)n′′ such that p
′′
j
n′′ =
pj
n for all j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t} and
p′′j
n′′ =
|A|!∑
i=t+1
pj
n(|A|!−t) for all j ∈ {t+ 1, t+ 2, . . . , |A|!} we have ϕ(P ) = ϕ(P ′′).
Proof. The proof is in Appendix B.5.
Example 4.1. As an example for those two cases, let us take some A with |A| = 3. Let us take
P ∈ L(A)n with support p = (8,7,6, 3, 0, 0) where bold numbers indicate the support for the
chosen delegates. As an example for two subcases of the Lemma 4.3, let us take P ′, P ′′ ∈ L(A)n
with supports p′ = (7, 7, 7, 3, 0, 0), p′′ = (8, 7, 6, 1, 1, 1) respectively. Then, Lemma 4.3 implies
ϕ(P ) = ϕ(P ′) = ϕ(P ′′) = {R1, R2, R3}.
Remark 4.1. Using permutations and merging as in the proof of Lemma 4.3, it is straightforward
to see that the lemma applies also to any subset of delegates or non-delegates. That is, averaging
between supports of some subset of chosen delegates or some subset of non-delegates will not
change the delegation.
In the next lemma, we show that if a preference is chosen as a delegate, it must have more
support than the total support for all the preferences which are not in the delegation. This is
mainly due to the strategy-proofness condition.
Lemma 4.4. If a rule ϕ satisfies ballot neutrality and strategy-proofness, then for all A ( A,
N ( N , and P ∈ L(A)n if R ∈ ϕ(P ), then we have
p(R) >
∑
R′ 6∈ϕ(P )
p(R′).
Proof. The proof is in Appendix B.6.
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4.2 When to choose a delegate, and when not to?
As seen in the previous four lemmas, any well-defined delegation rule satisfying conditions of
Pareto optimality, consistency, ballot neutrality, and strategy-proofness takes the most supported
preference in the delegation. However, for this preference to be the only delegate, it has to be really
powerful, i.e., powerful enough to eliminate all the other opinions. We need a new tool to capture
this. Take any ϕ which satisfies all the conditions. Categorize all P ∈ L(A)n for any N ( N
and A ( A according to the size of the delegations as follows: Pt = {P ∈ L(A)n | |ϕ(P )| = t}.
Lemma 4.1 and 4.2 imply that we only have to focus on the normalized support of the profiles
from stronger to the weaker. Therefore, we can define a vector for this ϕ for any A ( A as
kϕ(A) = [k1, k2, . . . . , k|A|!] ,where each kt = min
P∈Pt
(
t∑
i=1
pi)/n.
To ease the notation, we will omit ϕ from kϕ whenever it is clear. Furthermore, by ballot
neutrality, we know that for these rules the vector k is the same for every A with equal cardinality.
To understand these vectors, consider all profiles which end up with a single delegate under ϕ.
Then k1 gives us the relative support of the delegate with minimal value, among all the profiles
with a single delegation. Similarly ki gives the total relative support of the delegation with the
minimal value, among all the profiles with a delegation of size i. In what follows, we discuss some
features of these vectors.
Lemma 4.5 shows how ki values relate to one another. Lemma 4.6 shows if a preference has
more relative support than k1 it has to be chosen uniquely. Lemma 4.7 shows how the choice
of delegates depends on k in general. Finally, Lemma 4.8 shows how the vectors for sets of
alternatives of different sizes relate to each other.
Lemma 4.5. If a rule ϕ satisfies Pareto optimality, consistency, ballot neutrality, and strategy-
proofness, then for all A ( A, and N ( N the corresponding vector satisfies that kϕt (A) ≥
kϕt−1(A)+1
2 for all t ∈ {2, 3, . . . , |A|!}.
Proof. The proof is in Appendix B.7.
In the following two lemmas, Lemma 4.6 and 4.7, we assume an enumeration which orders
preferences according to their support from the agents from the strongest to weakest, i.e., pi ≥ pj
for all i < j. Lemma 4.6 shows that for profiles in which a strongest single preference has a
relative support p1/n more than k1, the delegation should only consist of this preference, R1.
Lemma 4.7 extends this to larger delegation sizes, i.e., the delegation should comprise of the first
t strongest preferences whose relative total support surpasses their corresponding threshold kt
while no smaller subdelegation satisfies this.
Lemma 4.6. If a rule ϕ satisfies Pareto optimality, consistency, ballot neutrality, and strategy-
proofness, then for all A ( A, N ( N and for any P ∈ L(A)n such that p1 ≥ nkϕ1 (A), we have
that ϕ(P ) = {R1}.
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Proof. The proof is in Appendix B.8.
Lemma 4.7. If a rule ϕ satisfies Pareto optimality, consistency, ballot neutrality, and strategy-
proofness, then for all A ( A, N ( N and for any P ∈ L(A)n such that
i) for some t > 1,
t∑
i=1
pi ≥ nkϕt (A) and,
ii) for all l < t,
l∑
i=1
pi < nk
ϕ
l (A)
we have: ϕ(P ) = {R1, R2, . . . , Rt}.
Proof. The proof is in Appendix B.9.
The next lemma shows that the corresponding vectors of the rules are independent of the
number of alternatives.
Lemma 4.8. If a rule ϕ satisfies ballot neutrality, then for any A ( A¯ ( A, the corresponding
vector satisfies that kϕ(A)t = k
ϕ(A¯)t for all t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |A|!}.
Proof. The proof is in Appendix B.10.
Note that Lemma 4.8 has further implications. In fact, for any two sets of alternatives, A,B
the kϕ(A)t and k
ϕ(B)t values will always correspond to each other. That can be achieved by
extending each of the sets to A ∪B by separately by implementing the lemma above.
Next, our main theorem finalizes the result by showing there is only one class of delegation
rules, i.e., the threshold rules, associated with a threshold function that satisfies all the conditions
we have imposed.
Theorem 4.1. A rule ϕ satisfies Pareto optimality, consistency, ballot neutrality, and strategy-
proofness if and only if for all A ( A, N ( N and P ∈ L(A)n we have that ϕ(P ) = ϕf (P ) for
some threshold function f .
Proof. We leave the if part to the reader and prove the only if part. Proposition 2.1 and Lemma 4.1
together imply that only preferences with higher support will be assigned as delegates as opposed
to those with lower support. Lemma 4.2 implies that the degree of this relative power will be
independent of the number of agents. Lemma 4.3 states that averaging of supports for delegates
will not change the delegation. This implies that only the normalized supports for the delegations
matter.
Given any rule ϕ satisfying the conditions, we can then construct a corresponding vector k(A)
where the ith entry is the minimum support needed for a delegation of size i across all preference
profiles on A. By consistency, k is constant across all possible subsets of agents N ( N , and by
Lemma 4.8, k(A)i = k(B)i, i.e., k is also constant across all possible sets of alternatives A ( A.
Hence, regardless of the domain of the delegation rule, one can construct a function f on positive
16
integers such that f(i) = ki for all possible delegations of size i. By Lemma 4.4, we have that
f(1) > 1/2. By Lemma 4.5, for all t > 1 we have that
f(t) ≥ f(t− 1) + 1
2
.
Thus, by construction, f : Z+ → (12 , 1] ∩Q is the unique threshold function induced by ϕ as
in Definition 6, and hence ϕ = ϕf is a threshold delegation rule.
5 Conclusion
This paper brings about a novel class of rules for choosing a delegation, characterized by intuitive
fairness, efficiency, and non-manipulability properties. The nature of these threshold delegation
rules is such that they provide a good compromise in at least three aspects, inclusivity, minimal-
ism, and non-manipulability. Inclusivity is often deemed as crucial since it results in the legitimacy
of the political settlement (Dudouet and Lundstro¨m (2016)). Minimalism, in the sense that not
everyone can be invited to the table, is also an important parameter of simplicity of design in
conflict resolution. Finally, non-manipulability of a delegation rule is essential so that people’s
true opinions are always reflected in the conflict resolution, preventing further re-escalation of
post-truce conflicts.
The rules we characterize share one important feature in common. If a single delegate is sent
by the rule to the table, then that delegate, and the opinion she represents, must have strictly
more than 50% support in the society. Let us consider a more demanding threshold rule which
requires a 60% for a single delegate representation. In that case, the minimal required support for
a delegation of size 2 becomes at least 80% (averaging 60% and 100%). The thresholds for larger
delegations quickly increase by averaging each threshold with 100% to find the next threshold,
making it harder for small delegations to reach. Therefore, these rules are fairly inclusive in most
of the cases. In addition to that, the more fragmented the society gets, the more inclusive the
rules become.
As hinted in the introduction, the lower bound of all the threshold rules follow a well-known
elementary geometric series related to Zeno’s Dichotomy (somehow also related to Aristotle’s
story on Achilles and the Tortoise). Let t denote the size of the delegation, and f denote a
threshold function. Then all the threshold functions obey the following lower bounds:
f(t) >
1
2
+
(
1
2
)2
+ . . .+
(
1
2
)t
=
t∑
i=1
(
1
2
)i
.
There are directions that we foresee for future research concerning the delegation choice. For
instance, our selection of minimal Kemeny distance as a measure of well-being of agents leads to a
particular definition of strategy-proofness, which implies non-externality in representation. That
is, we define a manipulation to be beneficial for an individual when the individual can successfully
alter the “minimal distance” to the delegation. Of course, one might define manipulation as
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successfully altering the “average distance” to the delegation instead, which includes externality
in representation, i.e., introducing additional delegates might reduce the well-being of agents.
Another direction is the choice of metric used to define strategy-proofness. Although Kemeny
distance is quite standard in the literature, one might employ other metrics to see the robustness
of these findings. We would like to note, however, that none of our proofs uses the properties of
Kemeny distance specifically. As long as the clustering result in Remark 2.1 can be reached, we
expect that our results can be generalized. Perhaps a minimal set of common features/axioms
satisfied by any metric will lead to similar results. We suspect one of this particular axioms to
be the betweenness axiom introduced in Kemeny (1959)16.
Another direction for future research is about our selection of minimal Kemeny distance as a
measure of well-being of agents. If the assumption of nonexternality in representation is modified,
and also reversed to see implications of different assumptions with the setup. One obvious way
would be to assume that agents do try to minimize the distance to the farthest delegate, or to
the mean of the delegation. In the most extreme generalization, one may also assume that each
agent has different ways of deciding between different delegations.
We conclude our paper by suggesting the policy makers that next time a peace delegation
of size t is summoned from different opinions, then the ratio of uninvited opinions should not
account more than (0.5)t of the population, e.g., if only 3 delegates are invited, then uninvited
groups should account for less than 12.5% of the population. This gives us a minimal bound for
inclusivity, furthermore can help us to quantify “negligible minorities”.
16Betweenness requires that if three rankings are on a line, i.e., the middle one also agrees on all pairwise issues
that has been agreed by the other two, then the distance should be additive.
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A Examples
A.1 Example for showing the Kemeny rule is not strategy-proof
Example A.1. Given a profile P ∈ L(A)n, a preference R is a Kemeny ranking for P, if for all
R′ ∈ L(A), we have that ∑i∈N δ(R,P (i)) ≤ ∑i∈N δ(R′, P (i)). A rule which assigns all Kemeny
rankings to each profile is called the Kemeny rule. More formally, the Kemeny rule, denoted by
ϕK , assigns to a profile P ∈ L(A)n: ϕK(P ) = {R ∈ L(A) | R is a Kemeny ranking for P}.
Our counterexample is just with 4 alternatives, and 11 agents. P is as follows:
d d d a c c a b b b b
a a a d a a b c c c c
b b c c b b d d d d a
c c b b d d c a a a d
It can be seen that ϕ(P ) = {abcd}. δ(abcd, bcad) = 2. The last agent can manipulate to
reach the following P ′:
d d d a c c a b b b b
a a a d a a b c c c c
b b c c b b d d d d d
c c b b d d c a a a a
It can be seen that ϕ(P ′) = {bcda}. δ(bcda, bcad) = 1. So, the last agent is in a better po-
sition with reporting a false profile. So, even though both the Kemeny rule and our strategy-
proofness condition is defined upon minimal Kemeny distance, we show that the Kemeny rule is
not strategy-proof.
A.2 Example for a rule which is Ballot Neutral
Example A.2. Let us take two sets, A and B with A ( A¯ , |A| = 3 and |A¯| = 4. Let us have
7 agents. For this example, we use the lexicographic enumeration where alternatives are ordered
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with their place in the alphabet, so R1 = abc, R2 = acb and so on, and R¯1 = abcd, R¯2 = abdc
and so on.
Let us define P ∈ L(A)7 as
a a a a a b b
b b b c c a c
c c c b b c a
Here, p = (3, 2, 1, 1, 0, 0).
Take some ϕ where ϕ(P ) = {abc} = {R1}. Next, we define P¯ ∈ L(A¯)7 as
a a a a a a a
b b b b b c c
c c c d d b d
d d d c c d b
Here, p¯ = (3, 2, 1, 1, 0 0. . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
20 zeros.
).
There is an injective function from A to A¯ that satisfies our condition. For pi(t) = t, we
have pt = p¯pi(t) = p¯t for all t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 6}. So, for ϕ to satisfy ballot neutrality, we must have
ϕ(P¯ ) = {R¯pi(1)} = {R¯1} = {abcd}.
Or, since ballot neutrality is binding two ways, we can claim that if ϕ(P¯ ) = {abcd} =
{R¯pi(1)} = {R¯1}, then we must have that ϕ(P ) = {abc} = {R1}.
A.3 Example for a profile in which ballot neutrality is used to increase coali-
tional options.
Example A.3. ConsiderA = {a, b, c}, N = 16, and a profile P whose support is p = (5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 1).
If ϕ(P ) = {R1, R2, R3, R4}, then agents whose preferences are not in the delegation have distance
of 1 to the nearest delegate in all possible permutations. So, there is not a possible clustering,
in which every agent strictly prefers some other non-delegate to the closest delegate for this par-
ticular alternative set. However, when we move to A¯ = {a, b, c, d}, it is easy to see that there is
such a cluster with correct injection.
B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
Proposition 2.1. If a rule ϕ satisfies Pareto optimality and ballot neutrality, then for all P ∈
L(A)n, ϕ(P ) ⊆ RP (P ).
Proof: Take some finite A ( A and N ( N . Take some preference profile P ∈ L(A)n with
RP (P ) ⊆ L(A). First, note that with equality, we are done. Suppose, for a contradiction, that
there exists a preference R ∈ ϕ(P ) with p(R) = 0 that is, a preference with zero support. Consider
any x ∈ A\A and let us construct the expansion of P to A¯ = A∪x by P¯ ∈ L(A¯)n as follows: for
all i ∈ N , P¯ (i) = P (i)||x where P (i)||x = P (i) ∪ (x, x) ∪ {(a, x) | a ∈ A}, i.e., concatenation of x
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with P (i). Clearly, for any a ∈ A and i ∈ N , (a, x) ∈ P¯ (i). Take any a ∈ A, and R∗ ∈ L(A¯) such
that (x, a) ∈ R∗. By Pareto optimality, R∗ 6∈ ϕ(P¯ ). Note that p¯(R∗) = 0 = p¯(R||x). Then by
ballot neutrality R||x 6∈ ϕ(P¯ ). As P¯ is an expansion of P , again by ballot neutrality, we conclude
that R 6∈ ϕ(P ).
B.2 Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proposition 3.1. For all A ( A, N ( N , P ∈ L(A)n, and all threshold functions f , the
threshold rule ϕf (P ) is well-defined.
Proof: Let us pick some threshold function f , and consider the corresponding threshold rule
ϕf (P ). To show that the rule is well-defined, we need to show the following.
1. There is always a t that satisfies ρt ≥ f(t).
For any p ∈ L(A)n, t = |A|!, satisfies this. Since any reported preference should be within
L(A), including all preferences in the delegation ensures to have cumulative support of 1. Since
by definition any f(t) ≤ 1, we have: ρ|A|! ≥ f(|A|!). This shows that the universal set is always
guaranteed to pass the relevant threshold.
2. There is always a unique way to pick the first t preferences.
Case 1: For all distinct i, j, we have pi 6= pj .
If this is the case, powers of the preferences are well ordered, there is a unique ordering
enumeration, so there is always a unique way to pick the first t preferences.
Case 2: For some distinct i, j, we have pi = pj .
We will show that for any pi = pj it is either Ri, Rj ∈ ϕf (P ) or Ri, Rj 6∈ ϕf (P ).
First, consider the case where the number of delegates is one. In that case, we must have
ρ1 =
p1
n ≥ f(1) > 12 . This directly shows that any enumeration has the same preference as its
first, whenever the first preference is passing the relevant threshold.
Second, consider the case when t∗ > 1. By definition, for all t > 1 we have that
f(t) ≥ 1 + f(t− 1)
2
. Multiply both sides by 2 to get
2f(t) ≥ 1 + f(t− 1). Subtract f(t) + f(t− 1) from both sides to get
f(t)− f(t− 1) ≥ 1− f(t). (B.1)
From definition of the rule, we know the following is true for some t∗:
ρt∗−1 < f(t∗ − 1), (B.2a)
ρt∗ ≥ f(t∗). (B.2b)
Multiplying both sides of B.2b by −1 and adding 1 to both sides we get
1− ρt∗ ≤ 1− f(t∗). (B.3)
Subtracting B.2a from B.2b leads to
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p(t∗)
n
> f(t∗)− f(t∗ − 1). (B.4)
If we combine B.3, B.4, and B.1 we get
p(t∗)
n
> f(t∗)− f(t∗ − 1) ≥ 1− f(t∗) ≥ 1− ρt∗ =
|A|!∑
i=t∗+1
pi
n
. (B.5)
The rightmost term is the total support for the preferences which are not part of the delegation,
where the leftmost term is the support for the weakest delegate. This implies that not only the
weakest delegate has strictly more support than the next preference, but he also has strictly more
support than the total support for non-delegates. This says that there is again a unique way to
select the topmost t preferences as delegates, even though the relevant enumeration is not unique
this time. In other words, when there is any tie between support for some preferences, by design
all of those preferences belong to the delegation or none of them.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 4.1
Lemma 4.1. If a rule ϕ satisfies consistency, ballot neutrality, and strategy-proofness, then for
all A ( A, N ( N and P ∈ L(A)n if R ∈ ϕ(P ) and p(R′) ≥ p(R), we have R′ ∈ ϕ(P ).
Proof: Suppose, for a contradiction, that there exists two preferences Rh (preference with
(h)igher support), and Rl (preference with (l)ower support) with Rl ∈ ϕ(P ) and Rh 6∈ ϕ(P ).
Let p(Rh) = h and p(Rl) = l. Without loss of generality, we can assume that h+ l is even since
by consistency we can replicate the profile once by using the two-fold replica with no changes in
the delegation. This will ensure that h− l can also be assumed to be even.
First, assume that h− l = 0. This contradicts ballot neutrality since h = l. Next, assume that
h − l = 2. In that case, an agent whose original preference is Rh may misreport Rl. Denoting
the modified profile by P ′, that will cause p′(Rh) = p′(Rl). From ballot neutrality, either both of
Rh and Rl will be in the delegation, or none will be included. If both are included, this means
that the agent deviated to his benefit, contradicting strategy-proofness. If none is included, some
agent with Rl as his original preference may report Rh to get back to the original preference
profile, resulting in Rl ∈ ϕ(P ) again, this also contradicts strategy-proofness. So for h − l = 2,
we showed that with the original preference profile, if Rl is included in the delegation, so must
Rh be.
Assume that our hypothesis holds for h − l = k for some even k, that is, if Rl ∈ ϕ(P ), then
Rh ∈ ϕ(P ). Now, let h − l = k + 2. Then an agent whose original preference is Rh can report
Rl to trigger the situation with h − l = k. Since this violates strategy-proofness, we must have
Rh ∈ ϕ(P ) even when h− l = k + 2. By induction, this completes the proof.
B.4 Proof of Lemma 4.2
Lemma 4.2. If a rule ϕ satisfies consistency and ballot neutrality, then for all A ( A, N,N ′ ( N
and for all P ∈ L(A)n, P ′ ∈ L(A)n′ such that p/n = p′/n′, we have ϕ(P ) = ϕ(P ′).
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Proof: From consistency, we know that ϕ(P ) = ϕ(2P ) = ϕ(3P ) = . . . = ϕ(nP ). So, ϕ(P ) =
ϕ(n′P ) and ϕ(P ′) = ϕ(nP ′). Since n′p = np′, ballot neutrality implies that ϕ(n′P ) = ϕ(nP ′),
completing the proof.
B.5 Proof of Lemma 4.3
Lemma 4.3. If a rule ϕ satisfies consistency and ballot neutrality, then for all A ( A, N ( N
and P ∈ L(A)n, denoting |ϕ(P )| = t, and picking an enumeration on L(A) such that pi ≥ pj for
all i < j, the following holds:
i) For any N ′ ( N for any P ′ ∈ L(A)n′ such that p
′
j
n′ =
t∑
i=1
pi
nt for all j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t} and
p′j
n′ =
pj
n for all j ∈ {t+ 1, t+ 2, . . . , |A|!} we have ϕ(P ) = ϕ(P ′).
ii) For any N ′′ ( N and for any P ′′ ∈ L(A)n′′ such that p
′′
j
n′′ =
pj
n for all j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t} and
p′′j
n′′ =
|A|!∑
i=t+1
pj
n(|A|!−t) for all j ∈ {t+ 1, t+ 2, . . . , |A|!} we have ϕ(P ) = ϕ(P ′′).
Proof: 1. Let P and p = (p1, p2, . . . , p|A|!) be as in the Lemma with |ϕ(P )| = t and P ′ as
defined in the Lemma. Consider the following profiles with the same enumeration on L(A)
where p1, p2, . . . , pt rotates and bold numbers indicate the support for the chosen delegates:
P 1 ∈ L(A)n such that p1 = (pt,p1,p2, . . . ,pt−1, pt+1, pt+2, . . . , p|A|!)
P 2 ∈ L(A)n such that p2 = (pt−1,pt,p1, . . . ,pt−2, pt+1, pt+2, . . . , p|A|!)
...
P t−1 ∈ L(A)n such that pt−1 = (p2,p3,p4, . . . ,p1, pt+1, pt+2, . . . , p|A|!)
From ballot neutrality, we know that ϕ(P ) = ϕ(P i) for any i ∈ {1, . . . , t − 1}. By design,
merging all these profiles (P, P 1, P 2, . . . , P t−1) gives us tP ′, and from consistency, we get
that ϕ(tP ′) = ϕ(P ). From Lemma 4.2 ϕ(P ) = ϕ(tP ′) = ϕ(P ′) is guaranteed.
2. Let P and p = (p1, p2, . . . , p|A|!) be as in the Lemma with |ϕ(P )| = t and P ′′ as defined
in the Lemma. Consider the following profiles with the same enumeration on L(A) where
pt+1, pt+2, . . . , p|A|! rotates and bold numbers indicate the support for the chosen delegates:
P 1 ∈ L(A)n such that p1 = (p1,p2, . . . ,pt, p|A|!, pt+1, pt+2, . . . , p|A|!−1)
P 2 ∈ L(A)n such that p2 = (p1,p2, . . . ,pt, p|A|!−2, p|A|!, pt+1, . . . , p|A|!−2)
...
P t−1 ∈ L(A)n such that pt−1 = (p1,p2, . . . ,pt, pt+2, pt+3, pt+4, . . . , pt+1)
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From ballot neutrality, we know that ϕ(P ) = ϕ(P i) for any i ∈ {1, . . . , t − 1}. By design,
merging all these profiles (P, P 1, P 2, . . . , P t−1) gives us tP ′′, and from consistency we get
that ϕ(tP ′′) = ϕ(P ). From Lemma 4.2 ϕ(P ) = ϕ(tP ′′) = ϕ(P ′′) is guaranteed.
B.6 Proof of Lemma 4.4
Lemma 4.4. If a rule ϕ satisfies ballot neutrality and strategy-proofness, then for all A ( A,
N ( N , and P ∈ L(A)n if R ∈ ϕ(P ), then we have
p(R) >
∑
R′ 6∈ϕ(P )
p(R′).
Proof: Let us denote by W = ϕ(P ) the preferences of “winning” agents, and by L = RP (P ) \
ϕ(P ) the preferences of “losing” agents, where RP (P ) = {R ∈ L(A) | p(R) > 0} is again the set
of reported preferences. Suppose, for a contradiction, that there exists a profile P ∈ L(A)n and
a preference Rt ∈ ϕ(P ) such that:
p(Rt) ≤
∑
R¯∈L
p(R¯).
That is, a preference Rt in the delegation has weakly less support than the total support for
all preferences of losing agents combined. By Remark 2.1, there exists an expansion of P , in
which the corresponding injections of W and L are clustered far away from each other. By the
same logic, one can find an expansion by pi, say P¯ , if needed to an even larger alternative set, in
which in addition to having pi(W ) and pi(L) as far away clusters, Rpi(t) is relatively closer to pi(L)
than to the other preferences in pi(W ). Formally:
max
R,R′∈pi(L)
δ(R,R′) < min
R∈pi(L),R′∈pi(W )
δ(R,R′) (B.6)
and for any R,R′ ∈ pi(L), R˜ ∈ pi(W ),
δ(R,R′) < δ(R,Rpi(t)) < δ(R, R˜) (B.7)
Now consider a transformation of this expansion, denoted by P¯ ′, where all losing agents
concentrate on a preference of a fellow losing agent, say Rs. By construction:
∑
R∈L
p(R) = p¯′(Rs)
By supposition, p¯(Rpi(t)) ≤ p¯(Rs). Note that by coalitional strategy proofness, we have
Rs 6∈ ϕ(P¯ ′). Then we have two cases:
Case 1: If Rpi(t) ∈ ϕ(P¯ ′), then by Lemma 4.1, Rs should also be in the delegation ϕ(P¯ ′),
which is a contradiction.
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Case 2: If Rpi(t) 6∈ ϕ(P¯ ′), furthermore by Inequality B.7, Rpi(t) is a favorable preference for
all agents with P¯ (i) ∈ pi(L). Then the agents in L can misreport (and disperse back to their
preferences in P¯ ). As Rpi(t) ∈ ϕ(P¯ ), this contradicts strategy proofness.
B.7 Proof of Lemma 4.5
Lemma 4.5. If a rule ϕ satisfies Pareto optimality, consistency, ballot neutrality, and strategy-
proofness, then for all A ( A, and N ( N the corresponding vector satisfies that kϕt (A) ≥
kϕt−1(A)+1
2 for all t ∈ {2, 3, . . . , |A|!}.
Proof: Let us start with some A ( A and some t < |A|! − 1. Using consistency, we can pick
some N ( N with |N | = n divisible by all numbers up to t+ 1 without loss of generality. Let us
take a specific P ∈ L(A)n, which is defined as pi = a for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t + 1} and pi = 0 for
i ∈ {t+2, t+3, . . . , |A|!}. From Proposition 2.1 and ballot neutrality, we know that the delegation
includes only the first t+1 preferences. Let us denote this profile as (with bold numbers indicating
the support for the chosen delegates)
p = (a,a, . . . ,a︸ ︷︷ ︸
t+1 times
, 0, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
|A|!−t−1 times
).
Now, let us deal with a modification P ′ ∈ L(A)n for this profile which is defined as p′i = a′ =
nkt
t for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t}, p′t+1 = b = n(1 − kt) and p′i = 0 for i ∈ {t + 2, t + 3, . . . , |A|!}. Since
the first t preferences have kt support in total, by definition of kt and by Lemma 4.3, we know
that the delegation includes only the first t preferences. Let us denote this profile as
p′ = (a′,a′, . . . ,a′︸ ︷︷ ︸
t times
, b, 0, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
|A|!−t−1 times
).
Another relevant modification of this profile, P ′′ ∈ L(A)n will be defined as p′′i = a′′ = n−2bt−1
for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t}, p′′i = b = n(1−kt) for i ∈ {t, t+1} and p′′i = 0 for i ∈ {t+2, t+3, . . . , |A|!},
e.g. p′′ = (a′′, a′′, . . . , a′′, b, b, 0, 0, . . . , 0). By Proposition 2.1 we have that ϕ(P ′′) ⊆ RP (P ), and
by ballot neutrality either i) ϕ(P ′′) = {R1, R2, . . . , Rt+1} or ii) ϕ(P ′′) = {R1, R2, . . . , Rt−1}.
Suppose, for a contradiction, that the former is the case. Let us take the average of support for
the first t preferences to get P ′. By Remark 4.1, this should not change the delegation. However,
ϕ(P ′) = {R1, R2, . . . , Rt} 6= {R1, R2, . . . , Rt+1} = ϕ(P ′′), which is a contradiction. So, it must
be that ii) is the case, ϕ(P ′′) = {R1, R2, . . . , Rt−1}. Let us denote this profile as
p′′ = (a′′,a′′, . . . ,a′′︸ ︷︷ ︸
t−1 times
, b, b, 0, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
|A|!−t−1 times
).
By definition, kt−1 is the minimal support for all delegations with size t − 1. Since only the
first t− 1 preferences are in the delegation, total support for the first t− 1 preferences could be
at least kt−1. Then, (t− 1)a′′ = (t− 1)n−2bt−1 = n(1− 2(1− kt)) ≥ nkt−1. After rearranging we get
that
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kt ≥ kt−1 + 1
2
.
B.8 Proof of Lemma 4.6
Lemma 4.6. If a rule ϕ satisfies Pareto optimality, consistency, ballot neutrality, and strategy-
proofness, then for all A ( A, N ( N and for any P ∈ L(A)n such that p1 ≥ nkϕ1 (A), we have
that ϕ(P ) = {R1}.
Proof: Let P ∗ ∈ L(A)n∗ be one of the profiles where |ϕ(P ∗)| = 1 and p∗1 = n∗kϕ1 (A), i.e., one
of the profiles wherein only a single delegate is assigned whose relative support defines k1 in
the corresponding vector. Consider now any P ∈ L(A)n with p1 ≥ nkϕ1 (A). By Lemma 4.1,
R1 ∈ ϕ(P ) and by ballot neutrality we can assume that ϕ(P ∗) = {R1}, i.e., the strongest ranking
is the same both in P and P ∗. Next, we show that R1 is the only delegate assigned to P , i.e.,
{R1} = ϕ(P ).
By consistency, we can replicate profiles P and P ∗ (n∗ and n times respectively) with no
changes in the delegation. With abuse of notation, let us denote these replicated profiles by
P, P ∗ ∈ L(A)n×n∗ . So, we have p∗1 = nn∗kϕ1 (A) and p1 ≥ nn∗kϕ1 (A).
Suppose, for a contradiction, that ϕ(P ) ) {R1}, so there is another delegate, say Rk in the
delegation. Let us partition L(A) into two sets, X = L(A)\{R1} and Y = {R1}. By Remark 2.1,
there exists an expansion of P by pi, say P¯ , in which the injection of X, i.e., pi(X) is clustered
far away from the injection of R1, i.e., Rpi(1). Formally:
max
R,R′∈pi(X)
δ(R,R′) < min
R∈pi(X)
δ(R,Rpi(1)) (B.8)
Note that Rpi(1) = pi(Y ) and Rpi(k) ∈ pi(X). Let P¯ ∗ denote the expansion of P ∗ by the same
injection, pi. By ballot neutrality, i) Rpi(k) 6∈ ϕ(P¯ ∗), implying kth strongest preference of P¯ ∗ is
not in the delegation of P¯ ∗, and ii) Rpi(k) ∈ ϕ(P¯ ), implying that the kth strongest preference
of P¯ is in the delegation of P¯ . Note that as p¯∗1 ≤ p¯1, from P¯ ∗ to P¯ this means that there is a
coalition of agents moving from pi(X) to Rpi(1), resulting in Rpi(k) ∈ ϕ(P¯ ). As Rpi(k) ∈ pi(X),
by Inequality B.8, this contradicts coalitional strategy proofness. Hence Rpi(k) 6∈ ϕ(P¯ ). Ballot
neutrality then implies that Rk 6∈ ϕ(P ).
B.9 Proof of Lemma 4.7
Lemma 4.7. If a rule ϕ satisfies Pareto optimality, consistency, ballot neutrality, and strategy-
proofness, then for all A ( A, N ( N and for any P ∈ L(A)n such that
i) for some t > 1,
t∑
i=1
pi ≥ nkϕt (A) and,
ii) for all l < t,
l∑
i=1
pi < nk
ϕ
l (A)
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we have: ϕ(P ) = {R1, R2, . . . , Rt}.
Proof: Take any P ∈ L(A)n as defined in the lemma. As
l∑
i=1
pi < nkl for all l < t, by definiton
of the corresponding vector, we have |ϕ(P )| 6= l. This means that |ϕ(P )| ≥ t. By Lemma 4.1 we
get that ϕ(P ) ⊇ {R1, R2, . . . , Rt}. Next, we show that ϕ(P ) = {R1, R2, . . . , Rt}.
By consistency, we can assume that
t∑
i=1
pi is divisible by t without loss of generality. By
Remark 4.1, we can take the average support for the first t preferences without changing the
delegation. Let us denote this modified profile by P ′, which is defined as p′i = a
′ =
t∑
l=1
pl
t if i ≤ t
and p′i = pi if i > t.
Let P ∗ ∈ L(A)n∗ be one of the profiles where |ϕ(P ∗)| = t,
t∑
i=1
p∗i = n
∗kt, i.e., one of the profiles
wherein only the strongest t delegates are assigned whose relative total support defines kt in the
corresponding vector.
By consistency, we can assume that
t∑
i=1
p∗i is divisible by t without loss of generality. By
Remark 4.1, we can take the average support for the first t preferences without changing the
delegation. Let us denote this modified profile also by P ∗, where p∗i = a =
n∗kt
t for all i ≤ t.
Using consistency, we can replicate profiles P ′ and P ∗ (n∗ and n times respectively) with
no changes in the delegation. With abuse of notation, let us denote these replicated profiles by
P ′, P ∗ ∈ L(A)n×n∗ . By construction, the total support for the strongest t preferences in P ′ is
larger than those in P ∗, i.e., n∗a′t ≥ nat.
Suppose, for a contradiction, that ϕ(P ′) ) {R1, R2, . . . , Rt} so there is another delegate, say
Rk with k > t in the delegation. Let us partition L(A) into two sets, X = L(A) \ {R1, R2, ..., Rt}
and Y = {R1, R2, ..., Rt}. By Remark 2.1, there exists an expansion of P ′ by pi, say P¯ ′, in which
the injection of Y is clustered far away from the injection of X. Formally:
max
R,R′∈pi(X)
δ(R,R′) < min
R∈pi(X),R′∈pi(Y )
δ(R,R′) (B.9)
Note that {Rpi(1), Rpi(2), . . . , Rpi(t)} = pi(Y ) and Rpi(k) ∈ pi(X). Let P¯ ∗ denote the expansion of
P ∗ by the same injection, pi. By ballot neutrality, Rpi(k) 6∈ ϕ(P¯ ∗) while Rpi(k) ∈ ϕ(P¯ ′). Note that
from P¯ ∗ to P¯ ′ there is a coalition of agents moving from pi(X) to pi(Y ), resulting in Rpi(k) ∈ ϕ(P¯ ′).
As Rpi(k) ∈ pi(X), by Inequality B.9, this contradicts coalitional strategy proofness.
B.10 Proof of Lemma 4.8
Lemma 4.8. If a rule ϕ satisfies ballot neutrality, then for any A ( A¯ ( A, the corresponding
vector satisfies that kϕ(A)t = k
ϕ(A¯)t for all t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |A|!}.
Proof: We denote corresponding threshold vectors as
kϕ(A) = [k1, k2, . . . , k|A|!]
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,kϕ(A¯) = [k′1, k
′
2, . . . , k
′
|A¯|!]
.
Suppose, for a contradiction, that there exist A, A¯ ( A such that A ( A¯ with for some
t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |A|!}, kt 6= k′t while for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t − 1}, ki = k′i. Without loss of generality,
assume that kt < k
′
t.
Then we construct a profile P ∈ L(A)n and an expansion of P , by some pi, denoted by P¯ such
that ρt > kt, ρt < k
′
t and ρi < ki for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t− 1}.
By Lemma 4.6 and Lemma 4.7 we have that ϕ(P ) = {R1, R2, . . . , Rt}, while ϕ(P ′) )
{Rpi(1), Rpi(2),...,Rpi(t)}. Since ϕ(P ′) includes other elements than the image of ϕ(P ) under pi,
this contradicts ballot neutrality.
C Independence of Axioms
The conditions used in the characterization were: Pareto optimality, consistency, strategy-proofness,
ballot neutrality. Below, to put forward the logical independence of those, let us take a look at
the following four social welfare correspondences.
• All but Pareto optimality: ϕ(P ) = L(A) for any P ∈ L(A)n.
• All but consistency:
ϕ(P ) =

R, if n is odd and ∃R with p(R) > N2
R, if n is even and ∃R with p(R) > 2N3
RP (P ), otherwise.
• All but strategy-proofness: ϕ(P ) = {R | p(R) ≥ p(R′) for all R′ ∈ L(A)}.
• All but ballot neutrality:
ϕ(P ) =
L(A), if |L(A) \RP (P )| = 1RP (P ), otherwise.
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